Hiding secret messages (SMs) based on DNA technologies plays a critical role in DNA computing. In recent years, scientists have hidden SMs at a specific site in the plasmids of various living cells. Unfortunately, this strategy was proposed without considering the attack of next-generation sequencing (NGS). Nowadays, NGS, which is a revolutionary massively parallel sequencing technique, is developing rapidly. With the help of NGS, sequencing completely unknown genomes is becoming popular in various laboratories throughout the world. The ability to sequence completely unknown genomes is a major threat to existing hiding strategies in living cells. To prevent against the attack of NGS, this paper proposes a scheme to hide SMs in living cells (SHSM). Compared with previous studies, the main contribution of SHSM is changing the specific single hiding site into random multiple hiding sites through the application of seamless clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats/CRISPR-associated9 (CRISPR/Cas9) technique. In SHSM, SMs are hidden in living cells with different puzzling messages at different sites every time to prevent against the attack of NGS. To read the SM, high-fidelity polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and Sanger sequencing are used. A hash function is used to ensure the integrity of the message. These measures mean that an attacker would not be able to determine the location of the SM using NGS. The feasibility of SHSM was validated by a wet-lab experiment, and the security was demonstrated by the system's entropy. The author hopes this study will bring attention to the threat of NGS, and advance the development of hiding SMs in living cells.
I. INTRODUCTION A. HIDING SECRET MESSAGES IN LIVING CELLS
The leak of secret messages (SM) can have disastrous consequences. For example, Queen Mary forfeited her life because of a leaked secret in the 16th century. The importance of protecting SM has led to the development of many technologies. Steganography, which focuses on preventing the discovery of SMs, has been in use for centuries. There have been many kinds of steganography throughout history, including, steganography ink, acrostic, and boards covered by wax, amongst others. The ancient Greeks even hid messages in their hair by writing them on the scalp. The advent of image, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jenny Mahoney. audio, and video technologies has changed steganography and recently, researchers have started to evaluate the use of DNA to transmit and protect SM.
DNA has been shown to be a useful data storage system with high reliability. The use of DNA for information storage is becoming increasingly popular with the rapid development of DNA technologies [1] , [2] . Now the researches have illustrated that DNA storage has a superior storage capacity [3] , [4] . In addition, it can use characteristics of living cells to capture, store, and propagate information [5] , [6] .
Based on this, scientists have transmitted SMs through hiding DNA messages in microdots or living cells [7] - [11] . Because living cells store information more stably and copy information conveniently via DNA replication, hiding SMs in living cells is attracting scientists in recent years. In 2011, Palacios et al. presented a method to transmit SM using arrays of genetically engineered strains of Escherichia coli (E. coli) [8] . The message was encoded as a fluorescent combination, and strains which expressed different fluorescent protein were printed as the carrier. Plasmids encoding the fluorescent protein genes and ampicillin resistance were transformed into E. coli. To read the SM, the ampicillin-resistant gene was used as the selectable marker, and isopropyl β-d-thiogalactoside (IPTG) was used to induce the fluorescent protein. Because the message was encoded with fluorescent rather than DNA, this method had a low information density. Based on this study, Wang Yanfeng et al. developed a data hiding model using recombinant DNA technique in 2019 [11] . In this model, the SM was first hidden at a specific site in a plasmid using restriction enzymes and ligase by recombinant DNA technique, and then the recombined DNA was transformed into living cells. To read the SM, living cells were screened by antibiotics resistance, and then plasmids were extracted and digested by specific restriction enzymes.
B. THE THREAT OF NEXT-GENERATION SEQUENCING (NGS) FOR HIDING SMS IN LIVING CELLS
The current strategy for DNA-based hiding methods in living cells is based on the insertion of the SM into a specific position of the plasmid (Figure 1(a) ). This strategy can resist the attack of conventional Sanger sequencing because this sequencing technology needs a primer, which is a short known sequence of DNA within the sequencing region. This means that an attacker cannot perform the Sanger sequencing because he/she knows nothing about the living cell.
Recently, next-generation sequencing (NGS) has emerged as a popular technology in the biosciences. NGS is a massively parallel sequencing technology that allows millions or billions of DNA strands to be sequenced simultaneously [12] , [13] . Researchers can perform de novo sequencing or metagenomic sequencing at relatively low cost using NGS. De novo sequencing refers to the sequencing of a novel genome that scientists know nothing about it. Metagenomic sequencing refers to the direct sequencing of all genetic elements from a community. Using NGS, sequencing completely unknown genomes is becoming popular in various laboratories throughout the world. Currently, NGS is most effectively applied in fields like medicine [14] - [16] , agriculture [17] , food safety [18] , and environmental science [19] .
Compared with Sanger sequencing, NGS can perform sequencing without any known sequence. This means the current hiding strategies cannot prevent the attacker from discovering the location of SM. NGS can obtain all DNA sequences in the cell, and determine the SM through alignment with natural cells or other intercepted information cells (IC). If the SM is obtained by the attacker, the attacker might do something though he/she did not know the content of the SM. For example, the attacker can replace the SM with an old intercepted one.
As one of the most important technologies in contemporary biotechnology, NGS will continue to develop. As a result, it is necessary to take the attack of NGS into account in the design of hiding SMs in living cells.
C. THE SCHEME FOR HIDING SMS IN LIVING CELLS
To ensure that hidden SMs in living cells cannot be obtained under the attack of NGS, this paper proposes a scheme for hiding SMs in living cells (SHSM). This study hid the SMs with different puzzling messages (PMs) in different sites every time in living cells using seamless clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats/CRISPR-associated9 (CRISPR/Cas9) technique. To read the SM, high-fidelity polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and Sanger sequencing were used. A hash function was used to ensure the integrity of the message. With the help of NGS, attackers will not be able to determine the location of the SMs. The scheme was verified by wet-lab experiments and proved from the perspective of entropy.
Compared with previous studies, the main contribution of SHSM is changing the specific single hiding site into random multiple hiding sites through the seamless CRISPR/Cas9 technique ( Figure 1 ). In the previous studies, the SM must be hidden at the specific site every time, if not, the receiver cannot obtain the message. In this study, the SM can be hidden at different sites every time (Figure 1(b) ). That is, the introns or unnecessary exons in the chromosome, and plasmids can become the hiding sites. This means a cell has millions of potential hiding sites, and the sender can select a different subset each time. For example, site S0, S3, and S6 can be used as the hiding sites the first time, and site S2, S5, and S9 can be used the second time. Because there is no link between the hiding sites and the SM, PMs, which are random DNA sequences, can be used flexibly to confuse the attacker. SHSM uses different PMs (including content and length) every time. The PMs and hiding sites are at the discretion of the sender, and there is no need to inform the receiver in advance, making this approach more secure and convenient than others. For instance, PM P1 can be inserted into site S6 independently; it also can be inserted into site S0 with SM or any other PMs. As a result, the attacker cannot distinguish the secret massage with PMs though he/she can obtain inserted DNA sequence through NGS.
II. BACKGROUND A. SEAMLESS CRISPR/CAS9
CRISPR/Cas9 is a revolutionary genome-editing tool that has become widely used to conduct precise genome editing, including insertion, deletion, and replacement. The CRISPR/Cas9 system uses a 20-bp guide RNA to guide the Cas9 enzyme to the editing target. Cas9 catalyzes a doublestranded break, inducing precise genome editing through homologous recombination with the help of a repair template. Usually, the CRISPR/Cas9 is conducted by introducing plasmids. Seamless CRISPR/Cas9 is a technique that cures the CRISPR/Cas9 plasmids after genome editing. Curing the plasmids means hiding the positions which have been edited because the sequence of guide RNA is incorporated into the plasmids.
B. HASH FUNCTION
The hash function is used to determine the integrity of the message. The hash function produces a unique and fixedlength hash value as a digital fingerprint for an arbitrarylength message. If the message received is not complete, its hash value changes.
C. HIGH-FIDELITY PCR
PCR selects and amplifies DNA fragments using primers. The primers are oligonucleotides that define the beginning and the end of the region to be amplified. High-fidelity PCR, which uses high-fidelity DNA polymerase, is widely accepted now. This technique has extremely low error rates within the 40-kb amplicon size.
D. ENTROPY
Entropy is a mathematical measure of uncertainty. The entropy of variable X is denoted as H (X), and H (X) = − log 2 P(X), where P(X) is the probability. The total uncertainty of variable X and variable Y is denoted as H (X, Y). If X and Y are independent random variables, then H (X, Y) = H (X) + H (Y). Conditional entropy is denoted as H (X|Y) and measures the uncertainty of X when Y is known. Information theory has proved the chain rule of entropy:
III. DESIGN A. SYSTEM DESIGN
The people involved in the transmission of a message include the sender, receiver, and potentially the attacker. Figure 2 illustrates the schematic of SM transmission. In SHSM, the sender and the receiver have the key table and key pool distributed in advance. The key needs to be changed every time. Once the key in the key table is exhausted, new key table and key pool should be distributed through secret channels. The SM and the key ID are transmitted through public channels. The attacker has NGS, so any inserted DNA sequences in any cell can be evaluated.
The process for the sender, the receiver, and the attacker is illustrated in Figure 3 . For the sender, the message is first encoded into DNA code, and then substituted to produce the SM through the substitution sequence (Sub), which is obtained from the key pool using PCR with the key. The purpose of using the substitution algorithm is to provide randomness to the SM through random substitution sequence. DNA code is encoded based on language information and cannot be completely randomized. DNA code can become random SMs through performing substitute with different random substitution sequence every time. Finally, the SM is hidden in living cells with PMs, which are random DNA sequences, to obtain an IC. The IC is then sent to the receiver through public channels. The receiver can obtain the SM and Sub using PCR with the key, and then recover it through the DNA substitution square. Figure 4 (a) illustrates the substitution algorithm. The left table of Figure 4 (a) is the DNA substitution square, and the right table is an example of its application. For the first DNA code T, c is used as the Sub. As a result, G, which is in row c, column T in the DNA substitution square, becomes the SM. Other SMs are obtained in the same way. The substitution algorithm is public. Figure 4 (b) shows the key table. Figure 4 (c) shows the structure of the key pool. The key pool is a DNA storage system that stores the Sub, which can be obtained using the PCR primer. The Sub, which is a random DNA sequence and flanked by forward and reverse sequences in the key table, is preserved in plasmids. A huge amount of Subs can be stored and used flexibly for messages with any length because of the super storage capacity and the random-access capacity of DNA storage. In this study, a small system comprising only six keys was used to illustrate the system. In fact, there are already a number of reliable DNA storage systems for the storage of a large number of keys available [1]- [5] .
B. AN EXAMPLE
Let us suppose that Alice wants to transmit the message ''This is a true message!'' to Bob, and Oscar is the attacker. The process of Alice, Bob, and Oscar are described below.
• Alice Alice encoded the message into a DNA code, and then substituted it into a SM and hided it into the genome with PMs. Below is a stepwise description.
Step 1: Encode 1. The message was converted to a binary string: ''010101000110100001101001011100110010000001 1010010111001100100000011101000110100001100 1010010000001110100011100100111010101100101 0010000001101101011001010111001101110011011 00001011001110110010100100001'' according to ASCII code. 2. Then, the binary string was converted to DNA code:
''CCCACGGACGGCCTATAGAACGGCCTATAGA ACTCACGGACGCCAGAACTCACTAGCTCCCGC CAGAACGTCCGCCCTATCTATCGACCGCTCGCC AGAC'' according to the rule: 00-A, 01-C, 10-G, 11-T. 3. PM4 was knocked-into the genome of another E. coli DH5α strain using seamless CRISPR/Cas9 to obtain Strain-2. Finally, Alice sent two copies of the Strain-1 and Strain-2 through different delivery services to prevent loss. Alice also sent the key IDs (message: 4; hash value: 6) through a public channel, such as e-mail. Figure 5 shows the hiding process of Alice.
• Bob After receiving the living organisms and key IDs, Bob cultivated the strain, synthesized the PCR primers, conducted high-fidelity colony PCR using the key's primers, and then sequenced the PCR products to obtain the SM. The original message and hash value were obtained according to their key's Sub. Finally, Bob verified the hash value to ensure that the message had not been mutated or tampered with during transmission.
• Oscar
Oscar is an attacker with NGS capabilities.
Let us assume that Oscar intercepts a copy of the SM. Oscar is familiar with the method, but has no key table and key pool.
First, Oscar would cultivate the strain, sequencing the two strains de novo, and analyze them using his strong NGS power. Oscar can find two inserts (exogenous DNA) through comparing the sequencing results.
The first insert is TGCCTGGCGGCGCCACCCAGAAG  CAACTGCATTGCAACTGCATTTAGCTCCACCACGCT  TAGTGATGTAACATTCTACCCGCACACTCCTACAATG  CGGTACGTTCTTAGCTGTTAGCTTACTAGGTGAAACG  CGCAGTACGTAGGCAGCGCCGATGGTAGTGTAAACA  TGCATCAAGCGTTTATCCATAAGATTAGCGGCGTAAG  GATAATATGGCCAAGGTCTCGTTTCGGAACTTTCGCT   CCTTGGCTACGGGTAGATCATTGGAACAGAATCAAA  GCGGGCGAAGCTGTCCCCCGGCATCCACCGATGGAT  AATCGGTAGGGAACATAGAA.  The second insert is TGCCACCTGACGTCTAAGAATAG  GTCCTATGATCATACGCTGTCGACGACGACGTCACTG  TAGTCTCACTACTGTCAAGTCTGCTGAGTCTACAGCG  TCTGGACAGTACGTCACGTAGCTAGTCAACTTACACT  ACTGTAAGCAGTCTGCTAAGTACTCTATGACTAAGTT  AGTCATAGCTGTGAGACGTCTACTGAGTACTAGCTCA  GGTATACTGGAAAACTACCTGTTCCATGGCCAACAC  TTGTCACTACTTTCGGTTATGGTGTTCAATGCTTTGC  GAGATACCCAGATCATATGAAACAGCATGACACGGT  CAGCTAGCTACAGTGAACGCGTCAGAGCGTATGACA  GGTAGTCCTGTAGGCTGTAGCTCTACTGGTCTGATC  ATACACTCTGGTCTACTAGGCTCACTCAAAGGCGGT AAT.
However, Oscar cannot determine where the SM is located. Firstly, Oscar cannot determine whether the information he intercepts is complete and secondly, he has no way to distinguish the PMs and SM because both of them are random. Oscar cannot determine whether the SM is present or not and he cannot determine the length and position of the SM. The only way he could do is to assume that all the subsequences for the two insert sequences are the SM.
Second, Oscar can analyze all the subsequences. For example, TGCAACTGCATTTAGCTCCACCACGCTTAGTGAT-GTAACATTCTACCCGCACACTCCTACAATGCG GTACGT is a 72-bp subsequence in the first insert. According to the substitution algorithm, there are four possibilities (A, G, C, and T) for the DNA code for every base according to the substitution algorithm. That is, all the possible DNA sequences with a length 72 may be the original DNA code. This means that any of the strings with length 18 (according to the code rule of Alice, a character was converted to a 8-bit binary string, then converted to a 4-bit DNA code), such as ''Computer is useful'', ''Alice will be come'', and ''Tom catches a cold'' may be the correct message. Another example is TTAGTGATGTAACATTCTAC-CCGCACACTCCT, which is a 32-bp subsequence in the last example sequence. It may also be the SM. This means that all the strings having the length 8, such as ''absolute'', ''tomorrow'', and ''abcd efg'' may be the correct message.
Finally, Oscar can analyze all the possible messages by comparing the hash results. According to the MD5 algorithm and DNA code rule, Oscar can compute that the length of the hash value is 64-bp. For example, GACAGTACGTCACGTAGCTAGTCAACTTACACTACT-GTAAGCAGTCTGCTAAGTACTCTATGAC is a 64-bp subsequence in the second insert. Oscar has to assume that it is the hash value. For every base in the subsequence, there are four possibilities (A, G, C, and T) for the DNA code according to the substitution algorithm. Thus, all the DNA sequences with length 64 may be the original DNA code. So, for any message, Oscar can judge this insert is its hash value. Consequently, Oscar is only able to discover that any imaginable message can be correct because of the diversity of length and semantics of the message.
C. GROUPING METHOD
It is worth mentioning that SHSM substitutes the message in a grouping mode in which the maximum length that can be substituted is L (L is the length of Sub and can be decided by the user). If the DNA code of the message is longer than L, a grouping method can be used. Figure 6 illustrates the grouping method. The DNA code is divided into several groups in which the length is less than or equal to L. Each group is then substituted individually, and an index is generated. The final index key ID is sent to the receiver. The receiver can recover the index step by step and obtain the message. On the one hand, the grouping method makes sure that message of any length can be substituted even if the Sub is stored in fix-length mode. On the other hand, the grouping method uses an index to ensure that the sender only needs to send the final index key ID to the receiver irrespective of the actual groups of the message.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
An SHSM is a nine-tuple (Message, DNA code, SM, IC, Primers, Sub, PM, Substitution algorithm, Recover algorithm) system which is extended from a classical fivetuple cryptosystem. In the SHSM, the following conditions are satisfied besides the conditions of classical five-tuple cryptosystem:
1. Sub is random DNA sequences; 2. PM are random DNA sequences; 3. Any two tuples in Primers, Sub, and PM are independent. Following is the mathematical proof of security:
(1) The diversity of length Suppose the length of the insert obtained from the captured IC is len. If the attacker can determine the length of the SM is len 1 , the length of the PM is len 2 = len-len 1 x
However, the length of the PM is random Suppose there is an integer len 3 = len 2 len 3 may be the length of PM Thus, len 3 = len-len 1 y According to x and y len 3 = len 2 Contradiction with len 3 = len 2 (2) The plasmids and oligonucleotides used in this study are listed in Tables 1 and 2 .
Strain-1: The sequences and oligonucleotides were synthesized by PolePolar Biotech., Beijing, China. Primers M-F and M-R were used to introduce the restriction enzymes PstI and SmaI by PCR. High-fidelity DNA polymerase KODplus was purchased from Toyobo, Osaka, Japan. The PCR result was digested by PstI and SmaI, and then inserted into the PstI/SmaI digested pUC18 vector. All restriction endonucleases and T4 DNA ligase were purchased from New England Biolabs, Beverly, MA, USA. The construct was verified by DNA sequencing (PolePolar Biotech). The plasmid was transformed into E. coli DH5α, using heat shock. All manipulations in this experiment were performed according to the manufacturer's instructions.
Strain-2: This strain was constructed using the CRISPR/ Cas9, with a two-plasmid system [20] . The sequence of the PM4 is: ''TGCCACCTGACGTCTAAGAATAGGTCCTATG ATCATACGCTGTCGACGACGACGTCACTGTAGT C T C ACTACTGTCAAGTCTGCTGAGTCTACAGCGTCTGG A CAGTACGTCACGTAGCTAGTCAACTTACACTACTGTA AGCAGTCTGCTAAGTACTCTATGACTAAGTTAGTCAT AGCTGTGAGACGTCTACTGAGTACTAGCTCAGGT A T ACTGGAAAACTACCTGTTCCATGGCCAACACTTGT C ACTACTTTCGGTTATGGTGTTCAATGCTTTGCGAGAT ACCCAGATCATATGAAACAGCATGACACGGTCAGC T AGCTACAGTGAACGCGTCAGAGCGTATGACAGGTAG TCCTGTAGGCTGTAGCTCTACTGGTCTGATCATACA C TCTGGTCTACTAGGCTCACTCAAAGGCGGTAAT''.
Plasmid construction: To construct pTargetF-N20, pTar-getF was amplified with primers pTargetF-N20-F and pTargetF-R, digested by DpnI, and self-ligated by T4 DNA ligase and T4 polynucleotide kinase (T4 PNK). The resulting plasmids were transformed into E. coli DH10B, and verified by sequencing (Tolo Biotch., Shanghai, China). DpnI was purchased from New England Biolabs. T4 DNA Ligase and T4 PNK were purchased from Tolo Biotech.
Genome Editing: To construct the DNA donor, E. coli DH5α genome was extracted and used as the template. The template was amplified with primers Up-F and Up-R to obtain a 522-bp upstream fragment and with primers DN-F and DN-R to obtain a 408-bp downstream fragment. The 468-bp insert DNA was synthesized by Tolo Biotech. The upstream and downstream fragments and the insert were amplified with primers Up-F and DN-R to obtain the DNA donor. To edit the genome, pCas was transformed into E. coli DH5α by using a heat shock method, and transformants were confirmed by resistance to kanamycin (50 mg/l). Next, competent cells were prepared for transformation. Arabinose (10 mM final concentration) was added to the culture for λ-Red induction. For electroporation, 50 µl of the cell suspension was mixed with 100 ng of pTargetF-N20 and 400 ng of donor DNA; electroporation was performed at 2.5 kV, 200 . Cells were recovered at 30 • C for one h before spreading onto LB agar containing kanamycin (50 mg/l) and spectinomycin (50 mg/l) and incubated overnight at 30 • C. Transformants were identified by DNA sequencing (Tolo Biotech) with primer Seq1.
Plasmid Curing: The curing of the plasmids was conducted using methods reported previously [20] .
B. COLONY PCR AND SANGER SEQUENCING BY BOB
High-fidelity colony PCR was conducted with the primers in keys 4 and 6. High-fidelity DNA polymerase KOD-plus (Toyobo) was used. Fig. 7 illustrates the PCR results. After the PCR, double terminal Sanger sequencing is conducted by Sangon Biotech., Shanghai, China. The sequencing results are illustrated in Figures 8-11 . The assembly result for key 4 is 5'-CGTAAGGATAATATGGCCAAGGTCTCGTTTCGGAA CTTTCGCTCCTTGGCTACGGGTAGATCATTGGAA C A GAATCAAAGCGGGCGAAGCTGTCCCCCGG-3', and the assembly result for key 6 is 5'-ATTTAGCTCCACCACGC TTAGTGATGTAACAT TCTACCCGCACACTCCTACAAT GCGGTACGTT-3'.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work constructed and verified an SHSM to defend against attack by NGS. Even with the help of NGS, the attacker cannot determine the existence, integrity, length, and starting position of the SM, even if he can intercept the IC.
When compared to hiding SMs in the electronic medium, like images or videos [21] - [25] , SHSM has several advantages. First, it is easy to disguise. The cell can be stored and transmitted in liquid, paper, or by plate, so it can be disguised as a drink, cosmetics, etc. Second, it is easy to prevent loss or damage. By using the replication capacity of DNA in living cells, the message is easy to make copies. Finally, it is easy to expend the attacker's resources. For example, the attacker will need to perform de novo sequencing twice if the sender separates the SM into two tubes. However, SHSM has several drawbacks, the major one being the high cost of this strategy, as a result of the expenses associated with DNA synthesis and sequencing. In this experiment, the synthetic cost for the short message and PMs was approximately $400. Nowadays, scientists can knock in at up to 10kb of DNA into an E. coli strain [26] , which would cost $2,000 in SHSM. Several hundreds of E. coli strains can be used easily in hiding messages, but the cost may be as high as millions of dollars. Second, the SHSM is not real-time. DNA synthesis and sequencing require several days to several weeks depending on the volume of DNA. In this experiment, a week was used to prepare the IC, and 2 days was used to read the SM. However, with the rapid development of biotechnology, the cost and time of DNA synthesis and sequencing will be reduced exponentially, making them more and more acceptable.
This study serves as a preliminary investigation into a novel model for hiding messages in living cells. Both NGS and CRISPR/Cas9 are emerging techniques, and both will continue to develop quickly, making their application more feasible. The author hopes this study will bring attention to the threat of NGS, and advance the development of hiding SMs in living cells.
